EARL LONG,
Plaintiff,
v.
AREA MANAGER, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION;
United States Department of the Interior; United States of America;
Secretary of the South Dakota Department of Game, Fish, and Parks; State of South Dakota,
Defendants.
[1999 DSD 24]
United States District Court
District of South Dakota -Western Division
CIV. 97-5089
Andrew B. Reid, Denver, CO
Attorney for Plaintiff
Bonnie P. Ulrich, Craig Peyton Gaumer
U.S. Attorney's Office, Sioux Falls, SD
Donna S. Fitzgerald
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC
Attorneys for defendant Bureau of Reclamation
Gary L. Richter, Department of Water & Natural Resources, Pierre, SD
Craig M. Eichstadt, Asst Attorney General, Pierre, SD
Attorneys for State of South Dakota and Secretary of Dept of Game, Fish, & Parks
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Richard H. Battey, Senior District Judge
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[¶1] On October 31, 1997, Earl Long ("plaintiff") filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to an interest in real property adjacent to the Angostura Reservoir Recreation Area ("Angostura" or "the park") near Hot Springs, South Dakota. His complaint is presented pursuant to the Quiet Title Act ("QTA"), 28 USC § 2409a. (fn1) Plaintiff also seeks injunctive and declaratory relief as provided by 28 USC §§ 2201, 2202.
[¶2] On March 31, 1999, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Interior, and the United States government ("federal defendants") collectively filed a motion for summary judgment (Docket #36). On that same day, South Dakota Game, Fish, and Parks and the state of South Dakota ("state defendants") filed their own motion for summary judgment (Docket #43). (fn2) Plaintiff has responded, and defendants have replied.
FACTS
[¶3] The facts giving rise to this lawsuit are as follows. In the late 1800's plaintiff's ancestors homesteaded in Fall River County ("the county") near Lithia, South Dakota. This area would later become the location of the Angostura Reservoir. In 1949, the United States condemned much of the land owned in this area pursuant to the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 USC § 258a.(fn3) A portion of the land owned by plaintiff's predecessor in title, A.J. and Rose Landers, was taken in fee simple as part of this condemnation. See Exhibit 2, Federal Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment ("FDMSJ") (Judgment of Declaration of Taking). In 1954, the state of South Dakota and the United States entered into a memorandum of understanding whereby the state could lease the reservoir area for use as a state recreation area and park. See Exhibit 16, Plaintiff's Response (memorandum of understanding). The park runs along the eastern shore of the reservoir and consists of a northern (or upper) half and a southern (or lower) half. Both parts are accessed by a separate system of park roads. See Exhibit 5, FDMSJ (ownership and access map).
[¶4] In 1962, plaintiff purchased the Landers' remaining property, located directly between the upper and lower parts of the park.(fn4) See Exhibit 20, Plaintiff's Response (Earl Long deposition). This property is bordered on the western side by park land and on all other sides by private property. See Exhibit 5, FDMSJ (ownership and access map). At the time of purchase, plaintiff had several means of accessing his property. Plaintiff could drive County Road 1B which ran east-west through Section 27; from this end he could connect with Lithia Road which ran north-south along the easternmost border of his property. See Exhibit 13, Plaintiff's Response (1971 aerial photograph).
[¶5] Plaintiff could also access his property by using roads within the interior boundaries of the park. See id. This was done in one of two ways. Plaintiff could take the park road located in the upper half of Angostura to its southernmost end. See id.; see also Exhibit 5, FDMSJ (ownership and access map). From this point, a dirt road (called the Landers' easement) provided quick access to plaintiff's land. Plaintiff could also take the park road located in the lower half of the park all the way to its northernmost end. From there, plaintiff could connect with the southernmost terminus of Lithia Road at two separate locations. See id. Once on Lithia Road, plaintiff could access his property at any point.
[¶6] Parts of Lithia Road were graded and developed in the late 1800s. See Exhibit 2-3, Plaintiff's Response (county road petition and meeting minutes of county commissioners - 1899). Other parts were improved or developed on or around the turn of the century. See Exhibit 4-8, Plaintiff's Response (county road petitions and meeting minutes of county commissioners - 1910-17). Although the southernmost part of Lithia Road was inundated by water from the reservoir in the 1950s, the county continued to maintain the northern portion of Lithia Road (running through Sections 27 and 34 and connecting with the westernmost terminus of County Road 1B) until the 1970s. See Exhibit 11, Plaintiff's Response (meeting minutes of county commissioners vacating western end of County Road 1B - 12/5/72-2/6/73). At the time of plaintiff's original purchase, Lithia Road was used by plaintiff, as well as by the general public and park employees. See Exhibit 10, FDMSJ (declaration of Assistant Park Manager Steven Papendick). Park employees used Lithia Road as a means of connecting the upper and lower portions of Angostura. See id.
[¶7] Unabated access to Lithia Road was curtailed in 1972, when the manager of Angostura petitioned the Fall River County Commissioners to close County Road 1B at a point before it adjoined the northernmost portion of Lithia Road. See Exhibit 11, Plaintiff's Response (meeting minutes of county commissioners vacating western end of County Road 1B - 12/5/72-2/6/73). Because Lithia Road could be used as a means to access both the upper and lower halves of Angostura without requiring a drive through the park entrance (and thus without necessitating payment of a park fee), it was hoped that this closure would force users of the park to enter through the official upper or lower park entrances. The petition was approved in January 1973, and County Road 1B was closed at its western end before it could connect with Lithia Road. A turn-around was then built at the end of County Road 1B. See id.
[¶8] The closure of the western end of County Road 1B eliminated plaintiff's access to his property from the north. See Exhibit 20, Plaintiff's Response (Earl Long deposition). According to plaintiff, he did not oppose the closing of County Road 1B because he was given verbal assurances by park management that he would always have access to his land through park roads located in the lower half of Angostura. See id. In fact, to this day it appears that plaintiff may access his land through a gate located at a point close to the section line between Sections 3 and 34, and near the southernmost end of the old portion of Lithia Road. See Exhibit 9, FDMSJ (declaration of the Director of the Division of Parks and Recreation Douglas Hofer); see also Exhibit 10, FDMSJ (declaration of Assistant Park Manager Steven Papendick).
[¶9] After 1973, park employees improved the portion of Lithia Road running through plaintiff's property, installed cattle gates at both remaining entrance points to plaintiff's land (at the Landers' easement and at the southern point of Lithia Road), and realigned a portion of Lithia Road to a better location. During this time, Lithia Road continued to be used by plaintiff, park employees, and the general public.
[¶10] In 1988, Gary and Shirley Wolff ("the Wolffs"), began developing lakeside lots east of plaintiff's property. In conjunction with this development, the Wolffs claimed a right of access from their property to Angostura. See Exhibit 15, FDMSJ (Wolff trial transcript). This claim resulted in litigation between the Wolffs and the South Dakota Department of Game, Fish, and Parks. (fn5) The Wolffs' claim increased park management's concern over the access to the park afforded by Lithia Road and the Landers' easement. In an attempt to prevent unlimited access to the park from entry points other than through the park's toll gates, park management shut down the Landers' easement access point located at the extreme southern end of upper Angostura, as well as both Lithia Road access points located at the northern end of lower Angostura. See Exhibit 10, FDMSJ (declaration of Assistant Park Manager Steven Papendick). Plaintiff alleges that the closure of these remaining points of access have left his land completely isolated with no viable point of ingress and egress. See Plaintiff's Complaint at ¶¶ 16-17.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
[¶11] Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a movant is entitled to summary judgment if the movant can "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [the movant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In determining whether summary judgment should issue, the facts and inferences from those facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the burden is placed on the moving party to establish both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that such party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 US 574, 106 SCt 1348, 1356-57, 89 LEd 2d 538 (1986). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations in the pleadings, but by affidavit or other evidence must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists.
[¶12] In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court views the evidence presented based upon which party has the burden of proof under the underlying substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US 242, 106 SCt 2505, 2513, 91 LEd 2d 202 (1986). The Supreme Court has instructed that "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US 317, 327, 106 SCt 2548, 2555, 91 LEd 2d 265 (1986). The nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," and "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 106 SCt at 1356.
[¶13] The teaching of Matsushita was further articulated by the Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 US 451, 468, 112 SCt 2072, 2083 (1992) where the Court said, "Matsushita demands only that the nonmoving party's inferences be reasonable in order to reach the jury, a requirement that was not invented, but merely articulated, in that decision." The Court expounded on this notion by reiterating its conclusion in Anderson that, "[s]ummary judgment will not lie . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Eastman Kodak, 504 US at 468 n.14, 112 SCt at 2083 n.14 (quoting Anderson, 477 US at 248, 106 SCt at 2510). To survive summary judgment there must be evidence that "reasonably tends to prove" plaintiff's theory; defendant meets the burden under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) when it is conclusively shown that the facts upon which the nonmoving party relied to support the allegations were not susceptible of the interpretation which was sought to give them; only reasonable inferences can be drawn from the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
[¶14] Plaintiff has filed suit in this Court seeking to quiet title to the access points described above in the name of himself and/or the public. Specifically, plaintiff urges (1) that Lithia Road survived the 1949 condemnation by the United States and remains a public easement; and (2) that both federal and state defendants are equitably estopped from denying the existence of this public easement. (fn6)
[¶15] Statute of Limitations
[¶16] Prior to examining the merits of these issues, the Court must address the threshold question of its subject matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 US 83, 118 SCt 1003, 1012, 140 LEd 2d 210 (1998). Defendants assert that plaintiff's challenge to the 1949 condemnation is time-barred by the QTA's twelve-year statute of limitations, thus depriving this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 USC § 2409a(g).
[¶17] The QTA serves to waive sovereign immunity on behalf of the United States in suits challenging title to real property in which the United States claims an interest. See Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. Of Univ. and School Lands, 461 US 273, 280, 103 SCt 1811, 1816, 75 LEd 2d 849 (1983). However, "'[w]hen waiver legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity.'" United States v. Mottaz, 476 US 834, 841, 106 SCt 2224, 2229, 90 LEd 2d 841 (1986) (quoting Block, 461 US at 287, 103 SCt at 1819); see also United States v. Sherwood, 312 US 584, 586, 61 SCt 767, 769, 85 LEd 1058 (1941). In short, when a QTA suit is time-barred by the twelve year statute of limitations, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction. See Block, 461 US at 287, 103 SCt at 1823. In addition, because the statute of limitations is a condition to the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity, it must be strictly construed in the government's favor. See Mottaz, 476 US at 841, 106 SCt at 2229.
[¶18] Given the foregoing, this Court must determine when the twelve-year statute of limitations began to accrue. The QTA provides: "Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessors in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States." 28 USC § 2049a(g). After careful review of the pleadings and exhibits presented in this matter, the Court concludes that the statute of limitations began to accrue in 1949, when plaintiff's predecessors in interest knew that the United States condemned the property in fee simple. Thus, plaintiff's claim was time-barred by 1961.
[¶19] The lands over which plaintiff claims a right of access were condemned pursuant to the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 USC § 258a, with the government obtaining title in fee simple absolute. Plaintiff argues that because the public continued to use Lithia Road as a point of access to Angostura until 1988 (when the park closed the remaining access points) he could not have been on notice of the government's right to block access to these roads until that time. Thus, plaintiff contends, his claim is not time-barred until the year 2000.
[¶20] Plaintiff's argument focuses on the wrong event for accrual purposes. Under the QTA, the statute of limitation begins to accrue when "plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States." 28 USC § 2049a(g) (emphasis added). Knowledge of the claim's "full contours" is not required. Rather, what is necessary is a reasonable awareness that the government claims some interest adverse to plaintiff or his predecessor in interest. See Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 789 F2d 1308, 1313 (8th Cir. 1985) (appeal after remand).
[¶21] In this case, plaintiff's predecessors in interest (the Landers) were on notice that no easements or public right-of-ways survived the 1949 condemnation. This is evidenced by the unambiguous Judgment on Declaration of Taking which provides: "The title and estate so acquired by the United States in said land is the fee simple/thereto." Exhibit 2, FDMSJ. Given the lack of ambiguity in the Judgment on Declaration of Taking, the Court is left with only one conclusion: as a party to the condemnation proceedings, the Landers were on actual notice of the government's interests no later than May 2, 1949. Therefore, it appears that the statute of limitations expired on May 2, 1961. (fn7)
[¶22] Survival of the Lithia Road Easement
[¶23] Plaintiff's claim also fails on the merits. Plaintiff argues that Lithia Road survived the 1949 condemnation and remains a public easement. This argument is unsupported by the plain language of the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 USC § 258a (the statute under which the United States condemned the property). This Act provides in pertinent part:
Upon the filing said declaration of taking and of the deposit in the court . . . title to the said lands in fee simple absolute, or such less estate or interest therein as is specified in said declaration, shall vest in the United States of America, and said lands shall be deemed to be condemned and taken for the use of the United States ... .
40 USC § 258a. Under the express terms of this statute, if the government seeks to condemn a lesser estate, it must be specified in the declaration of taking. Because the Landers' property was condemned in fee simple absolute (with no lesser interest being specified) a public easement over Lithia Road could not have survived the condemnation. (fn8) See 40 USC § 258a; see also A.W. Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 US 149, 151, 45 SCt 38, 69 LEd 216 (1924) (holding that ordinarily an unqualified taking in fee simple takes all interests, founds a new title, and extinguishes all previous rights) (citations omitted); United States v. Herring, 750 F2d 669, 672 (8th Cir. 1984) (observing that "'[t]he condemnation is a proceeding in rem brought against the land itself. It extinguishes all previous rights and gives title to the United States good against the world'") (quoting Fulcher v. United States, 632 F2d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1980)); Holdridge v. United States, 282 F2d 302, 307 (8th Cir. 1960) ("Ordinarily, where unlimited use is contemplated, condemnation abrogates and extinguishes all preexisting interests in the property"). Because the Lithia Road easements could not have survived the 1949 condemnation, any preexisting interests plaintiff might seek to quiet title in have been extinguished.
[¶24] Equitable Estoppel
[¶25] Plaintiff also contends that defendants are equitably estopped from denying the existence of a public easement over Lithia Road due to their own conduct. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that "the affirmative conduct of Defendants, and the Plaintiff's reliance upon such conduct, directly led to plaintiff's loss of his access to his property." Plaintiff's Combined Brief in Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Response) at 16. This argument is also without merit.
[¶26] Although plaintiff attributes the "affirmative conduct" to defendants generally, a close reading of plaintiff's complaint and response shows that only the state defendants promised plaintiff continued access to his land. It is significant that the state defendants do not own Angostura, but instead lease it from the United States. This Court does not believe that promises made by the state defendants can serve to divest the federal defendants of fee simple title acquired by lawful condemnation. See United States v. California, 332 US 19, 40, 67 SCt 1658, 1669, 91 LEd 1889, 1900 (1947) (observing that "[t]he government, which holds its interests here as elsewhere in trust for all the people, is not to be deprived of those interests by ordinary court rules designed particularly for private disputes over individually owned pieces of property ... .") (quoted in Wolff, 1996 SD 23, ¶ 28, 544 NW2d 531, 536).
CONCLUSION
[¶27] This Court has carefully scrutinized the pleadings and exhibits presented in this matter and concludes that plaintiff's suit is time-barred by the twelve-year statute of limitations found in the Quiet Title Act, 28 USC § 2409a(g). Nevertheless, even assuming plaintiff's claim was not time-barred, the United States condemned the land in question in fee simple absolute pursuant to the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 USC § 258a. Accordingly, any rights possessed by the public or plaintiff's predecessors in title were extinguished and these rights may not be revived through the use of a quiet title action. Therefore, it is hereby
[¶28] ORDERED that the federal defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket #36) is granted. Judgment shall be entered in favor of the Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Interior, and the United States government.
[¶29] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the state defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket #43) is also granted. Judgment shall be entered in favor of the South Dakota Game, Fish, and Parks and the State of South Dakota.
[¶30] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the state defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket #43) is denied as moot.
Footnotes
1. 28 USC § 2409a provides in pertinent part:
(a) The United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water rights.
...
(g) Any civil action under this section, except for an action brought by a State, shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States.
. . .
(n) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit suits against the United States based upon adverse possession.
2. The state defendants have also filed a motion to dismiss (Docket #41) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) .
3. 40 USC § 258a provides in pertinent part:
In any proceeding in any court of the United States outside the District of Columbia which has been or may be instituted by and in the name of and under the authority of the United States for the acquisition of any land or easement or right of way in land for the public use, the petitioner may file in the cause, with the petition or at any time before judgment, a declaration of taking signed by the authority empowered by law to acquire the lands described in the petition, declaring that said lands are thereby taken for the use of the United States.
...
Upon the filing said declaration of taking and of the deposit in the court, to the use of the persons entitled thereto, of the amount of the estimated compensation stated in said declaration, title to the said lands in fee simple absolute, or such less estate or interest therein as is specified in said declaration, shall vest in the United States of America, and said lands shall be deemed to be condemned and taken for the use of the United States . . . .
4. Specifically, plaintiff purchased land located in Section 27, 28, 33, and 34 described as follows:
Township 8 South, Range 6 East, Black Hill Meridian
Section 27: SW1/4SW1/4
Section 28: SE1/4SE1/4
Section 33: NE1/4NE1/4, E1/2SE1/4NE1/4, N1/2NW1/4SE1/4NE1/4
Section 34: W1/2W1/2, Less 12.5 ACRES
5. See Wolff v. Secretary, Game, Fish & Parks Dept, 1996 SD 23, 544 NW2d 531.
6. Plaintiff also passingly alleges a takings claim, contending that the closings of the Landers' easement and Lithia Road points of access "have resulted in and will continue to result in a substantial interference with Plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land amounting to a taking of an interest in plaintiff's property without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." Complaint at ¶ 17. Beyond this initial allegation, however, plaintiff provides scant evidence or authority in support of his claim. He does not seek compensation for the taking and his response to defendants' motion for summary judgment fails to provide any discussion in support thereof. In short, plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in his favor on this claim.
7. A different result might be required had the Judgment on Declaration of Taking been ambiguous. In such a case, the fact that the public's use of Lithia Road continued unabated after the condemnation might have generated sufficient uncertainty so as to not impart reasonable notice of the government's interest in the property until 1988 - the year park management closed the road. See Patterson v. Buffalo Nat'l River, 76 F3d 222, 224 (8th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff's predecessor in interest not on notice where deed conveying property to the United States was ambiguous as to whether grantors relinquished their right to access their retained property through government property). However, in this case, plaintiff's predecessors in interest were clearly aware that the government took in fee simple. This lack of ambiguity ends the matter.
8. It is noteworthy that the South Dakota Supreme Court came to much the same conclusion in Wolff v. SD Game, Fish & Parks Dept.:
The roadway at issue is in Angostura. As previously observed, Angostura is owned by the United States Government and is merely leased to the South Dakota for purposes of a recreational area administered by the State. A condemnation judgment in the settled record conclusively establishes that the United States obtained fee title to what is now Angostura by condemnation on May 2, 1949 ... . The condemnation judgment reflects no exclusion for the easement Wolffs' now claim. Thus, any easement Wolffs' might claim was acquired by their predecessors in title was taken by the United States in 1949.
1996 SD 23, ¶ 27, 544 NW2d at 536 (footnote omitted).
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